ASEAN's failures in Myanmar may prevent even worse from happening
The organization may lack in the power to force a resolution, but it can prevent the conflict from turning into a proxy war.
The 2021 coup in Myanmar precipitated a protracted crisis in the country that has been front and center within the ASEAN community’s priorities for three years and counting. It is one of several events in recent years that have dramatically underscored the organization's limitations. While ASEAN provides a valuable forum for dialogue, the requirement for unanimity in its decision-making, coupled with the highly diverse nature of its 11 member countries, rules out its ability to respond to situations collectively in all but the most non-controversial of circumstances. Despite the group’s failures at bringing an end to the conflict in Myanmar, the trust and cohesion the group creates among its members is a factor in preventing the conflict from devolving into a Syria-style proxy conflict.
Following a 13-year experiment with democracy, Myanmar exploded into civil war following the 2021 coup by the military seeking to reestablish the military junta that had ruled the country through much of the second half of the 20th century until 2008. Initially, under Cambodia’s 2021 chairing of ASEAN, the organization joined with much of the West in voicing concern over the violence targeting civilians and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties.
By April, only three months after the coup, ASEAN had outlined a 5-Point Consensus, articulating a path to stop the violence and peacefully seek a political resolution.
On the situation in Myanmar, the Leaders reached consensus on the following:
First, there shall be immediate cessation of violence in Myanmarand all parties shall exercise utmost restraint.
Second, constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people.
Third, a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the assistance of the Secretary-General of ASEAN.
Fourth, ASEAN shall provide humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre.
Fifth, the special envoy and delegation shall visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned.
Although Myanmar’s generals initially agreed to the 5-Point Consensus, it never moved to implement them. It was bared later that year from participation in ASEAN summits until progress was seen.
The initial reaction from ASEAN appeared decisive and gained the support of much of the international community, including the US and EU. China and Russia, both long-time supporters of military rule in Myanmar, also gave a more cautious endorsement. However, ASEAN moved with as much unity as they did because much of the 5-Point Consensus is more of a milk-toast set of platitudes about peace and stability than a concrete plan for resolving the conflict.
This distinction underscores ASEAN’s seeming inability to manage a crisis in its backyard, which is important to its members. The organization’s democratic countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, have consistently been vocal about what is unfolding in Myanmar. At the same time, those with authoritarian political structures, such as Vietnam and Laos, have been more reluctant to criticize out of concern that they may be opening themselves up to future criticisms over their own human rights records. Thailand, which shares a long border with Myanmar, has taken a more accommodating approach to the junta driven by the long-standing relationship between the two country’s militaries.
Shifting approaches
Indonesia assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023 following Cambodia’s one-year term as the crisis in Myanmar shifted from its opening stages to a more protracted conflict. Driven by the limitations imposed on any peace process by the recalcitrance of Myanmar’s military, their ongoing support from China and Russia, and the constraints imposed from within ASEAN’s own political structure, Indonesia has sought a different approach from Cambodia. Cambodia initially sought a direct and forceful role in criticizing the junta and pushing to end hostilities. By contrast, Indonesia has instead brought a more flexible approach focused on keeping parties engaged and talking and less directly focused on achieving an immediate resolution.
ASEAN’s strategy under Indonesian leadership is further complicated by the actions of the organization’s other member countries taken outside of the ASEAN framework. In particular, Thailand has sought to capitalize on its own military’s close relationship with Myanmar to engage with the junta informally. This process involved the more authoritarian-leaning members of ASEAN, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, as well as Bangladesh, while the group's other democracies sat it out.
The Thai-led discussions focused more on smuggling, drugs, and human trafficking than on a substantive peace process, further muddying any potential efforts by ASEAN to engage Myanmar’s various parties in a new peace process. The lack of clearly defined roles in engagement between Myanmar and the other members of ASEAN, coupled with the group's inability to impose real costs on Myanmar’s military, all but guarantee that the country’s issues will continue to be litigated through force of arms instead of via a negotiated resolution.
Cooperation within ASEAN
ASEAN’s impotence in the face of the unfolding tragedy in Myanmar illustrates the organization’s limitations in generating collective action in response to security concerns. This shortcoming is also displayed in other security dilemmas facing the organization, including its inability to stand united in the face of Chinese provocations in the South China Sea. There, ASEAN has been unable to articulate a unanimous resolution because China has successfully co-opted Cambodia’s ASEAN vote.
Much like the BRICS, these limitations beg the question: what good is an organization like ASEAN if it cannot provide for collective action within its community? The reality in international organizations is that there is little stopping a member from acting outside the organization's best interests short of coercive measures such as sanctions. Because of this, instances of collective actions within multilateral institutions tend to be narrowly defined. An example of this would be the famous Article 5 of the NATO charter, which provides for collective defense if a member nation is attacked but does not automatically provide for the support of any military action members may engage in.
However, while some may view organizations that stop short of being able to organize their members for collective actions as performative, they do bring real utility to their members in other ways by lowering the costs of cooperation. This happens as trust is built through repeated interactions, and standards and protocols for member cooperation are gradually laid out. These trust-building benefits are visible in the excellent track record within the region of avoiding international conflict between member states since ASEAN’s expansion to all Southeast Asian states despite numerous unresolved territorial disputes and glaring ideological differences between its members.
Instability in Myanmar and growing geopolitical turmoil within the region tend to create centrifugal forces that would naturally drive the states of Southeast Asia into competing blocks aligned with outside powers, much as was the case during the Cold War. However, the greater degree of trust and cooperation enabled by ASEAN is creating a counterbalance against these forces, allowing its members to stand together where it makes sense for them but also stand independently of one another, confident that that independence will not leave them fatally vulnerable to competing camps within the region. This dynamic underpins Southeast Asia’s ability to capitalize on the multipolar moment. In the case of Myanmar, this may also be a factor in why outside powers haven’t put their fingers on the scale as they have in other civil conflicts around the world. Ultimately, the efforts of ASEAN to engage and manage the conflict, however ineffective they’ve been, have helped keep Myanmar from growing into a larger proxy conflict.